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Lumpkin: Corporations

CORPORATIONS
I. FRAuD

AN

AMisREPESENTATIOw

The case of Jaobson v. Yaschik 1 provided probably the most
interesting court conclusion in the field of corporate law this
past year. The plaintiff and the defendant owned all the capital stock in a close corporation. The defendant was the president, general manager, majority stockholder (75%) and the
dominant figure in the corporation. In 1964 the defendant purchased the plaintiff's shares (25%) and proceeded to sell them
at a profit to a third party under a previously arranged contract of sale. The plaintiff sued under two theories: (1) Failure
of the defendant to inform her that he had contracted to sell her
stock at a price in excess of that which he was paying to her was
a fraudulent concealment, in violation of a fiduciary duty
entitling her to a proper pro rata share of the full value received
by the defendant; (2) By reason of the existent fiduciary duty,
failure to reveal the contract amounted to a constructive representation that no such contract existed, thus entitling plaintiff
to the sum of $100,000.00 actual and punitive damages. The
defendant demurred upon the grounds that: (1) Mere silence as
to his selling arrangements was no active perpetration of fraud
and therefore insufficient to state a cause of action; (2) No
allegation had been made that the defendant gained special
knowledge by the fact of his position in the corporation. The
defendant argued the so-called majority rule: that an officer or
director of a corporation does not stand in a fiduciary relation
with a stockholder with respect to his stock, and in the absence
of circumstances from which fraud or unfair dealings may be
inferred, an officer or director of a close corporation is under no
duty to volunteer information to a stockholder from whom he
2
purchases stock.
The plaintiff claimed that, because of the defendant's dominant position in the corporation, the court should rule under the
special facts doctrine exception to the majority rule, i.e., that
when a director or officer has knowledge of special facts by
virtue of which the value of the stock has been enhanced, but
which special facts are not known to the minority stockholder,
the officer or director is required to make a full disclosure of
1. 155 S.E.2d 601 (S.C. 1967).
2. Brief for Appellant-Respondent.
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such facts. 3 For authority the plaintiff cited Black v. Simpson.4
In that case the defendant, a director and general manager of
an open corporation actively induced plaintiffs to sell their
stock. In sustaining the overruling of defendant's demurrer, the
Black court, in apparent dicta stated:
The defendant, as director and manager, was trustee not
only of the corporation, but for all the stockholders. 10 Cyc.
787, 2 Pomeroy's Eq., sec. 1090. His duty was to manage the
corporate property for the benefit of the stockholders; and
in the performance of that duty he was chargeable with the
utmost good faith. It was a breach of his trust to all of the
stockholders to use any means to acquire for himself the
corporate property except in the open after giving to the
stockholders, fully and candidly all material information he
possessed as to its condition and value .... 5
In writing its decision the Jacobson court acknowledged both
the majority rule and the exception to the rule. Utilizing the
above quoted statement from Back which the plaintiff had interpreted as dicta, the court came to the innovative conclusion
that:
[W]e think that the holding in the Black case commits this
court to the minority rule above stated, that officers and
directors of a corporation stand in a fiduciary relationship
to the individual stockholders and in every instance must
make a full disclosure of all relevant facts when purchasing
shares of stock from a stockholder. 6
Several questions are posed by the court's conclusion.
1. What significance should be attached to the fact that the
court has applied the minority rule to the close corporation?
2. What effect will this case have in blurring certain distinctions between the open and close corporation?
3. Accepting the broad language used by the court in applying
the minority rule, might the court not narrow its scope if confronted with differing factual situations?
3. Brief for Plaintiff, Respondent-Appellant.
4. 94 S.C. 312, 77 S.. 1023 (1913).

5. Id. at 315, 77 S.E. at 1025.
6. Jacobson v. Yaschik, 155 S.E.2d 601 (S.C. 1967) (emphasis added).
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This minority rule has generally been one applied to the duty
owed by officers, etc. in open corporations. In considering the
close corporation most courts have looked to situations involving
superior knowledge, confidential relations, and special circumstances affecting duties. As a matter of policy, however, this
new ruling may be beneficial to the operations within the close
corporation. There the minority stockholder stands to lose more
than an ordinary stockholder considering that the former usually
owns a greater share of the outstanding stock than the latter.
This decision also appears to give the close corporation stockholders protection equivalent to that which the fraud and mislepresentation provisions of the Securities Exchange Act 7 give
the stockholders in the open corporation. Historically, these provisions have offered more protection to minority stockholders of
the open corporation. It is much easier to prove that a majority
stockholder, such as an officer in an open corporation, is by virtue of his inside position in possession of information not available to minority stockholders. Under the provisions of this act
against the use of manipulative and deceptive devices in the
purchase of securities, a closely held corporation, negotiating for
the purchase of a minority shareholder's stock, can fairly deal
with those who have had many years of intimate acquaintances
with the affairs of the corporation. Now, fair dealing must be
accompanied by a full disclosure to the stockholders of all facts
affecting actions taken by the officers or directors.
It is obvious that the defendant in Jacobson was the dominant
figure in the close corporation. Even so, the court "stretched" the
law in applying Black (active misrepresentation, open corporation) to Jacobson (mere silence, close corporation). How much
further the court will be willing to apply the minority rule is
difficult to determine. For instance, would this broad application of the minority rule be applied to a situation in which the
person purchasing the stock in a close corporation was not a
dominant figure (holding no office and having ownership of
less than a majority of the stock) ? The general trend of authority indicates that being an officer or corporate official is the
important factor in determining whether the minority rule is
applied. Also, how would the court treat the majority stockholder in the close corporation who held no elected or appointed
7. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78a (1963). For a discussion of the application of the
Securities Exchange Act to close corporations see Annot, 7 A.L.R.3d 486
(1966).
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position? In summary, the court has, with the questionable
judicial authority of the Black case, blurred certain distinctions
between close and open corporations. It is doubtful, however,
that it will apply the broad minority rule in an all encompassing
fashion in situations such as the hypotheticals suggested above.
II. SERvICE oF PROCESS UPoN FoRIGN CoPoxATroNs

During the year there was an increase in the cases litigated
under our service of process statute." These cases indicate not
only a continuing broadened application of our statute,9 but also
an inclusion of a greater diversity of types of foreign business

activities.
The South Carolina Supreme Court has admitted that no universal formula has been, or is likely to be, devised for determining what constitutes "doing business" by a foreign corporation
within a state in such sense as to subject it to the jurisdiction of
the courts of that state. The question must be resolved upon the
facts of the particular case. 10
In CarolinaBoat and Plastics Company v. Glascoat Distributors, Inc.1- Glascoat's salesman called regularly upon firms in
South Carolina for the purpose of soliciting orders for Glascoat's products. Orders were filled by shipment in interstate
commerce or directly from the manufacturer amounting to more
than $10,000 annually. Glascoat, in contesting sufficiency of
service, relied heavily upon Phillips v. Knapp-Monarch Co.,12
in which the defendant made no sales in South Carolina and
had no agents here. There it was held: a foreign corporation
whose manufactured products passed through channels of trade
into South Carolina where they were resold by independent merchants did not "transact business in the State.',, CarolinaBoat
differed factually, the agent having soliciting orders directly
from firms within the state. The court, however, made no reference to the Phillips decision or this factual distinction. Without
applying any specific factual test it listed certain factors for con8. S.C. CODE ANx. §§ 10-424, 12-2324 (1962).
9. Id.
10. E.g., State v. Ford Motor Co., 208 S.C. 379, 38 S.E2d 242 (1946) ; Jones
v. General Motors Corp., 197 S.C. 129, 14 S.E.2d 628 (1941).
11. 249 S.C. 49, 152 S.E2d 352 (1967).
12. Brief for Appellant, Phillips v. Knapp-Monarch Co., 245 S.C. 383, 140
S.E2d 786 (1965).
13. Phillips v. Knapp-Monarch Co., 245 S.C. 383, 140 S.E.2d 786 (1965).
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sideration in determining whether 'a corporation is doing business in the state: (1) duration and nature of the corporate
activity within the state, (2) the character of the acts giving
rise to the litigation, (3) the circumstances of their commission,
and (4) the relative inconvenience to the respective parties of a
trial in the state of the forum. It held that there was sufficient
contact for service using the vague jurisdictional test from
Boney v. Trans-State Dredging Co. 14 requiring only that the
corporation have such contact with the state that the maintenance
of an action against it in personam shall not "offend notions of
fair play and substantial justice." With business procedures
becoming increasingly sophisticated, situations similar to the
Phillips case may become increasingly vulnerable to our service
of process statute utilizing this broadening principle of the law.
In Ard v. State Stove Manufacturers15 the federal district
court held that a foreign corporation engaged in the manufacture of household appliances which it sold directly to approximately 25 concerns in the state which in turn sold to the general
public and which had a manufacturer's representative that
called on prospective customers in the state had the necessary
minimum contacts consonant with fundamental fairness for the
court to exercise jurisdiction based on substituted service on the
corporation in accordance with South Carolina statutes. The
court, moreover, recognized factual similarities with the previous decisions of Shealy v. Challenger Manufacturing Jo.16
(defendants both delivered products into the state in trucks
driven by its employees) and Carolina Boat17 (solicitation by
agents).
In Middlerooks v. Curtis Publishing Company18 the defendant magazine publisher solicited subscriptions and distributed
its magazines in the state to wholesale dealers through its wholly
owned subsidiary. Upon the facts the federal district court
applied a Tenth Circuit decision, Curtis Publishing Company V.
Cassel, 9 concerning the questions of "minimum contacts" and
due process of law. The court again recognized that our state
14. 237 S.C. 54, 115 S.E.2d 508 (1960). The test seemingly broadens the

statutory limits to the constitutional bounds set by International Shoe Co. v.

Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
15. 263 F. Supp. 699 (D.S.C. 1967).
16. 304 F.2d 102 (4th Cir. 1962).
17. 249 S.C. 49, 152 S.E.2d 352 (1967).
18. 264 F. Supp. 373 (D.S.C. 1967).
19. 302 F.2d 132 (10th Cir. 1962).
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supreme court has made it clear that the term "doing business"
has been equated with such minimal contacts that the maintenance of a suit does not "offend traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice," and that whatever limitations it imposes
is equivalent to that of the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.
In Siegling v. InternationalAssociation of Approved Basketball Offieials, Inc., 20 the federal district court held that contacts
between a Maryland incorporated national association of basketball officials and local boards and members in South Carolina
from which the association profited financially through royalties
on sales of approved equipment were such that the assumption
of jurisdiction of a diversity suit against the association did not
offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice,
and would be consonant with the due process provisions of the
fourteenth amendment. From Shealy,2 1 Carolina Boat,22 and
Boney23 the court formulated a general principle that although
there is no set formula by which "miniumu contacts" may be
weighed, the material factor is the quality and nature of the
corporation's activity rather than quantity (repeated in Middlebrooks, 24 supra). It applied this formula to this situation in

which there were no subsidiary dealings, soliciting agents, or
business franchising. Siegling was not a case of actually "doing
business," but rather of controlling activities within the state.
In Amicale Industries,Inc. v. S.S. Rantur 2 5 the federal district court was asked to decide three separate issues: (1) whether
service of process on a local port agent was valid service on a
foreign ship owner in an in personam action, (2) whether a
foreign ship owner was amenable to substituted service pursuant
to a state "long-arm" statute; and (3) whether the court should
have declined jurisdiction in any event on the ground that the
bills of lading stated that exclusive jurisdiction of the controversy be vested in the German courts. The court found that there
was no contractual agreement between the local agent and the
foreign shipping company, and that therefore service upon the
local agent was insufficient. In determining the second issue, the
20. 262 F. Supp. 441 (D.S.C. 1966).
21. 304 F.2d 102 (4th Cir. 1962).

22. 249 S.C. 49, 152 S.E.2d 352 (1967).
23. 237 S.C. 54, 115 S.E.2d 508 (1960).

24. 264 F. Supp. 373, 375 (D.S.C. 1967).
25. 259 F. Supp. 534 (D.S.C. 1966).
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court cited Gkiafis v. S.S. Yiosonas26 and concluded that substituted service pursuant to Section 10424 of the South Carolina
Code 27 was sufficient. In Gkiafis the Fourth Circuit applied a
similar Maryland statute28 to serve a vessel which had been in
port at Baltimore on only four occasions prior to the commencement of the action. On these facts the Fourth Circuit indicated
that only a few contacts with the state can subject a corporation
to jurisdiction, if the contacts themselves are sufficient. Our
supreme court has not been confronted with the minimum contact argument based on a few contacts or a single transaction
within the state. The Amicale court, however, by citing the
Gkiafis case, reaffirms the broadening interpretation of our
service of process statutes. The court ultimately declined jurisdiction on grounds that the bill of lading provision was reasonable and would be enforced.
Surinam Lumber Corporation v. Surinam Timber Corporation20 was an action for a declaratory judgment in the federal
district court, the basis of which was a contract between the
plaintiff, a South Carolina corporation, and the defendant, a
corporation of the country of Surinam, which contract was presently the subject of a lawsuit by the defendant in the courts of
Surinam. Under the plaintiff's contract with the defendant, the
plaintiff was to serve as exclusive selling agent for the defendant's products in South Carolina; but there was no showing that
any order was ever filled by the defendant. The court noted
further that under the terms of the contract the entire performance of the contract was to take place substantially in the country of Surinam. The court concluded that upon these facts the
requisite minimum contacts to warrant jurisdiction were lacking.
It is important to emphasize that the contract which was the
basis of the cause of action was essentially unconnected with the
activities of the defendant in the state. Recognizing this, the
court quoted International Shoe that:
[i]t has been generally recognized that the casual presence
of the corporation agent or even his conduct of single or
26. 342 F.2d 546 (4th Cir. 1965).
27. "[S]ervice may be made by leaving a copy of the paper in the hands of

the Secretary of State ......
28.

MD. CODE

ANN. art. 23, § 96(d) (1957). "[S]uch corporation shall be

conclusively presumed to have designated the Commission as its true and lawful
attorney authorized to accept on its behalf service of process...."
29. 259 F. Supp. 206 (D.S.C. 1966).
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isolated items of activities in a state in the corporation's
behalf are not enough to subject it to suit on causes of action
unconnected with the activities there.

0

The Supreme Court in Perkins v. Bequet Consolidated Mining Co.31 has subsequently held that under appropriate circumstances due process of law under the fourteenth amendment
would not be violated by courts either taking or refusing jurisdiction of a foreign corporation in a cause of action not arising
out of the corporation's activities within the state. With this
broadening concept of "minimum contact," a slight increase of
the defendant's activities within the state could have subjected it
to our service of process statutes.
An interesting question can be raised regarding defendants
activities within the state. Query: If a third party had exercised substituted service or service upon the exclusive selling
agent, in an attempt to bring an action against the foreign corporation relating to the activities within the state, would the
court find the requisite "minimum contacts?" Based upon the
broadening concept of "minimum contacts" as previously mentioned, our courts might well accept this service as valid.
In State v. Guy Mobile Home Corp.3 2 the state sought to
recover a statutory penalty 3 from a foreign corporation for
delay in filing the declaration designating the place it could be
served with legal process. 3 4 The circuit court assessed the penalty at the rate of ten dollars per day, for the full period of 121
days during which the defendant did business in the state. On
appeal by the corporation, the South Carolina Supreme Court
held that where the corporation filed the declaration 121 days
after it began to do business in the state, and the statute required
that the declaration be filed within 60 days, the corporation
should not have been assessed the statutory penalty of ten dollars a day for 121 days, but ten dollars per day for only sixtyone days.
30. Id. at 209 quoting from International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.

310 (1945).
31. 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
32. 248 S.C. 386, 149 S.E2d 913 (1966).
33. S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-737 (1962).
34. S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-721 (1962);
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III. "PIRnCING TIM CORPORATE VEIL"

McCullough v. Urquhart 5 and Long v. MoGlonP6 can be discussed together because both examine the corporate structure or
entity. In McCullough, vendors had contracted to sell land subject to restrictive covenants. Before conveyance the vendors
incorporated but neglected to convey to the new corporation this
land which was under a contract of sale to the plaintiffs. The
corporation later recognized this error and issued a deed which
was accepted by the vendees. The vendees then brought an
action to have the title confirmed in them and to have the land
declared free from restrictive covenants. They took the position
that since the defendant corporation did not have title of record
to the lots in question when the corporation conveyed them,
such deed was void and could not operate to restrict the three
lots. The court recognized that the corporation did not hold
the record title, but that the stockholders who were the original
vendors prior to incorporation, did. The court looked behind
the corporate structure and held that the corporation was
actually the stockholders acting to convey the land. Because the
stockholders owned the corporation the land could be legally
conveyed by it; and it was immaterial that the stockholders
believed that they had previously conveyed the land to the corporation. Perhaps another way to view the transaction was that
the corporation acted as the agent of the stockholders and was
given the authority to convey this land.
The court concluded, upon good authority, that the3 7plaintiffs
were estopped to question the title of the defendants
Long v. McGlonP8 presented a question of novel impression
to the federal district court. This was an action by a trustee of
a bankrupt corporation against all the shareholders thereof, who
were also the directors and officers, to hold them personally
liable for the debts of the corporation. The defendant moved to
dismiss the action on the grounds that the complaint failed to
state a claim against the defendants for which relief could be
granted. The rationale was that the complaint did not suffi35. 248 S.C. 328, 149 S.E.2d 909 (1966).
36. 263 F. Supp. 96 (D.S.C. 1967).
37. See, e.g., Cruger v. Daniel, 1 McMul. Eq. 153, 193 (S.C. 1841). "All

parties and privies are bound by an estoppel ...
veyance is estopped to deny his grantor's title."

so a party accepting a con-

38. 263 F. Supp. 96 (D.S.C. 1967). Following a denial of the motion to dis-

miss, defendant defaulted in the action and judgment was entered for the
plaintiff.
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ciently allege facts which would support an action by the trustee
for conversion of corporate funds; and' that, while a creditor
might pierce the corporate veil, a trustee could not. This second
proposition presented the novel question.
The defendant based the second theory on the reasoning that
the existence of the trustee affirmed the existence of the corporation. Having the trustee pierce the corporate structure would
be a contradiction in terms. Moreover, a hardship would be
worked on the creditors who were claiming against the corporation if their claims were shifted against individual shareholders.
Although the court found no precedent which allowed a trustee
to pierce the corporate veil, the court upset the corporate immunity on pure common sense and the logical objectives of
liability.
First, in sections of the Bankruptcy Act 9 it is generally
accepted that a trustee in bankruptcy represents all persons
interested in the estate. Since the entire corporate stock was
actually held by two stockholders, no prejudice to corporate
creditors was caused by seeking to hold these individual shareholders. Moreover, does piercing the veil mean that the corporation does not exist or that it will be disregarded in this instance?
Without answering this question specifically, the court reasoned:
if the trustee exists, as claimed by the defendants, only as long
as the corporation exists, the same might be said of corporate
creditors. Now that these creditors have the standing to pierce
the corporate veil it follows logically that the trustee should
have the same power.

Finally, the court looked to provisions in the Bankruptcy
Act,40 giving the trustee the equivalent general powers of the
creditors. From these provisions the court extracted the general
principle of allowing the trustee to pursue all funds possibly
available to pay creditors. Here the court is saying that not only
can the trustee "pierce the corporate veil," but that in appropriate circumstances a trustee can pursue funds in bankruptcy
wherever they exist. One final query: with a creditor suit and
trustee suit against the shareholders of a nominal corporation,
which would take precedence? This case indicates the general
supremacy of the trustee.
JoHN H. LUMMNv, Jn.
39. See generally, Notes, 11 U.S.C.A. § 110 1251-1330 (Supp. 1966).
40. 11 U.S.C.A. § 110 (c) (Supp. 1965).
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